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1Electromagnetic Analysis Perturbation using Chaos
Generator
Abstract—Cryptographic algorithms albeit mathematically
sure may have security breaches when implemented on hardware
chips. There are several ways to compromise their security, one
method is to analyze their electromagnetic (EM) emissions in
order to find secrets (cryptographic keys for example). This paper
proposes a proof of concept of a countermeasure against these
attacks, it is based on a chaotic oscillator coupled with an antenna
to blur the EM emissions of the chip. The objective is to generate
EM noise within the chip with an internal system in order to
make the secret information harder to extract. A testchip was
developed and tested in conditions as close as possible to real use-
case to prove the relevance of the concept. The EM field collected
while running the chip were superposed to AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) emissions collected using a similar setup to
test the disturbing effect of the noise on a CPA, a classic attack to
retrieve AES keys. The experiment shows that it can effectively
increase the difficulty of finding the keys, proving that the basic
concept and the developed chip can be used as a countermeasure
for EM analysis attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
This study proposes a countermeasure concept based on
coupling a cryptographic chip with a chaotic EM generator. It
could prevent side-channel attacks relying on analysis of EM
field.
The circuit used is generating random EM emissions. It is
based on a true random number generator (TRNG) using a
discrete-time chaotic oscillator described in [1]. This method
is low-power making it suitable for a built-in countermeasure.
The chaotic nature of the output signal was well demonstrated
as it passed the NIST randomness test suite [2] but the
characteristic period of the oscillations was too high (from
500us to 5ms) to be realistically used against a cryptographic
system typically running at tens of MHz.
II. EM EMISSIONS FROM CHAOS GENERATOR
The prototype chip tested was designed without protections
(ESD protection, insulating resin), therefore many precautions
were needed not to damage it. In particular a safety distance
between the EM probe and the chip antenna was necessary. It
resulted on a reduction of the magnetic field collected and an
important background noise. To tackle this issue, the raw mea-
surements had to be processed to extract relevant data. These
processing included the selection and the synchronizations of
given patterns to see their EM signatures. It showed that the
EM signature of some of these patterns had amplitudes of the
order of typical signatures of cryptographic circuits.
The processing also showed that the amplitude of some
patterns were variable, depending on the chaotic input. In these
patterns, the chaotic nature of the signal was carried in their
amplitude instead of their frequency allowing a use to perturb
higher frequency signals. A realistic way to test the validity
of our method is to superpose the cryptographic signatures
and the chaotic signatures and use cryptanalysis methods to
retrieve the key and see the effects of the perturbation.
The cryptographic traces used were measured on a
software AES embedded in a 32bits micro-controller running
at 50MHz, the attack is a CPA focusing on the subbyte
operation of the algorithm.These traces were superposed
with the variable amplitude patterns signatures. There were
divided into eight groups with each a different amplitude
and for each cryptographic traces one of these signature was
randomly selected and superposed with a random time offset.
A multiplicative factor on the perturbation was set to simulate
the fact that the EM measurement was attenuated due to
distant constraints. The results presented above show a
significant increase of the number of traces needed to retrieve
the key. On this particular configuration the key is easily
found even with the countermeasure but the perturbation
it causes have a visible effect on the cryptanalysis which
is likely to remain even on more resilient configuration
(hardware implementation for example).
III. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE WORK
The experiment is a proof of concept for the perturbation
of cryptanalysis methods using this type of method. They
show that despite the circuits running at different frequen-
cies, the countermeasure is able to significantly increase the
number of traces and therefore the time needed to retrieve
the cryptographic key. Further experiment on other targets
are being planned to confirm the viability of the concept.
The objective is integrating both the cryptographic circuit and
the countermeasure on a single chip to propose a built-in
protection against EM cryptanalysis.
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